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Abstract:  
      Mobile ad hoc network (MANET) is a wireless network based on a group of mobile nodes without any 
centralized infrastructure. In civilian data communication all nodes cannot be homogeneous type and not do a 
specific data communication. Therefore, node co-operation and cheat proof are essential to successfully run 
MANETs in civilian data communications. Denial of service and malicious behavior of the node are the main 
concern to secure and successful communication in MANETs. This scheme proposed a generic solution to 
prevent malicious behavior of the node by the cluster head through single hop node clustering strategy. 
Keywords: ad hoc network; MANET; cheat proof; malicious node; Black hole attack.   
 
1. Introduction 
      Mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs) is an infrastructure less, self-organizing network where a set of 
mobile nodes (capable of receiving and transmitting radio signals) can quickly set up a temporary network [1]. 
This type of networks is very useful in emergency situation like a battle field, rescue operation after natural 
disaster, commercial application like vehicular ad hoc networks, communication in conference hall and many 
more [2]. There are many underlined protocols are available to establish this type of network [3]. We can 
classify all these protocols into three broad categories: one is proactive or table driven such as DSDV [4], WRP 
[5], FSR [6], etc., second type is reactive such as AODV [7], AOMDV [8], DSR [9], etc. and the third category 
is hybrid where some part of the network is proactive and other part reactive, such as EMR-PL [10], TORA 
[11], etc.   
      In most of the routing protocol network security and lack of co-operation among nodes are yet to be solved. 
It is true fact that MANETs is not successful in civilian data communication because of lack of co-operations 
and malicious behavior of some nodes, although it is successful in specific communication such as military 
data communication. Attacks by some malicious nodes from inside of the network are a main security issue in 
MANETs. This malicious behavior is not an issue of military communication or any other specific 
communication of MANETs, because all nodes of such type of communication are same type and they are 
specifically working in that communication. But in general life data communication and networking, mobile 
nodes are open and types are different such as cell phone, laptop, palmtop, PDA etc. Therefore, network 
security is very much important here.                   
       In our scheme of cheat proof communication through cluster head (C3H), we use single hop clustering 
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strategies as a generic mechanism to increase network security through cluster head (CH), so that MANETs 
could be successful in civilian data communication. We know that clustering scheme is more scalable and we 
can see it in FESC [12]. In single hop clustering all the nodes attached with CH directly and makes the entire 
network into different partitioned called clusters. CH are connected to each other through gateway nodes and 
established a MANETs and this CHs will take responsibility of network security and increase co-operation 
within networks. Network security is a big challenge from starting time of MANETs [13]. All the network 
security and co-operation attacks in MANETs can be classified into two broad categories: one is selfish attack 
and another one is a malicious attack. Malicious attack is more harmful than selfish attack in this type of 
networks. This scheme explains the idea to make prevention, such malicious attacks one by one through CHs. 
     The rest of the paper organized as follows: In section 2 similar works has studied, section-3 explain 
clustering strategy,  our proposed solution to malicious attacks has shown in section-4, in section-5 discussion 
of simulation results and conclusion has drawn in section-7.   
 
2. Literature survey 
      Many node co-operation and cheat proof scheme proposed by many researchers so far. Some prominent 
schemes are as follows:   
      In [14] Thomas J. Giuli and Mary G. Baker suggest a routing scheme based on DSR [9] to detect 
misbehaving node using ‘watchdog’ and give labels using ‘pathrater’. By this ‘pathrater’ nodes are classified, 
and then misbehaving or malicious node avoided.  Levente Buttyan and Jean-Pierre Hubaux proposed a virtual 
currency based scheme called ‘Nuglet’[15] to increase node co-operation in MANETs. The researchers of this 
scheme used two purse models; one is a Packet Purse Model (PPM) where ‘Nuglet’ debited from the source of 
the packet, and another is a Packet Trade Model (PTM) where ‘Nuglet’ debited from the source of the packet, 
and another is a Packet Trade Model (PTM) where ‘Nuglet’ debited from the destination of the packet. This 
scheme also described the purpose of increasing ‘Nuglet’ for a node, and also discussed security of these 
‘Nuglet’. Pietro Michiardi and Refik Molva proposed a reputation based scheme called CORE [16]. This 
scheme stimulates selfish node to avoid selfish behavior such as denial of service attack. In [17] Sheng Zhong 
et. al proposed a simple, cheat-proof, credit-based system for mobile ad-hoc networks with selfish nodes called 
SPRITE. This is an incentive credit or debit based system without any tamper proof hardware. Here node can 
get inceptive by showing receipt of forwarded message from Credit Clearance Service (CCS). Frank Kargl et.al 
proposed Advanced Detection of Selfish or Malicious Nodes in Ad hoc Networks [18]. This scheme explains 
activity-based overhearing, iterative probing and unambiguous probing to detect malicious and selfish nodes in 
the network. In [19] N. Nasser and Y. Chen proposed an intrusion detection scheme. Here malicious nodes 
detected by overhearing the network then give responses.  This is an enhanced version of ‘watchdog’ and 
‘pathrater’.  In [20] Nan Kang et.al present a misbehaving node detection scheme at IIWAS2010. They used 
different Intrusion Detection System (IDS) alternate to watchdog to detect malicious node. This IDS is called 
Enhanced Adaptive ACKnowledgement (EAACK) which had tried to overcome difficulties of watchdog.  
       Enrique Hernandez-Orallo et.al proposed cocoa as a collaborative contact based ‘watchdog’[21] to 
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effectively detect selfish nodes with less time. This scheme said to depend on ‘watchdog’ only is too much 
expectation, rather CoCoWa use collaborative work, based on the diffusion of local selfish nodes awareness. 
Jian-Ming Chang et.al proposed a Cooperative Bait Detection Approach CBDS [22] based on DSR [9]. This 
scheme exploits both proactive and reactive defense architectures. Here authors used reverse tracing approach 
to defend a collaborative attack by malicious nodes. In [23] Sara Berri et.al present reputation based node 
cooperation at an international conference. According to their scheme co-operation of node can be increased by 
adding or deducting reputation of that node within the network. If a node denied giving service to reputed 
node, then the most reputation will lose compare to deny servicing less reputed node. Similarly could gain 
more reputation by serving reputed node and less for non-reputed node.    
 
3. Clustering scheme details 
       The main problem of MANETs is the mobility of node and for that reason topology is very dynamic. Due 
to this high mobility traditional protocols and security scheme of fixed network is not working in ad hoc 
networks. As a clustering strategy could mimic the topology of traditional network and it reduces the 
scalability problem which is very essential for MANETs and it can also reduce other problematic issues in 
MANETs. Here we have adopted FESC [12] that is a single hop clustering scheme with some modifications 
for cheat proof and co-operation among nodes in MANETs. There are three types of nodes in this scheme  
      
 
 
 
 
.  
 
 
 
                                   Figure-1: an instance of our clustering 
namely Cluster Head(CH), gateway node and ordinary member. Single hop clustering scheme is a strategy 
where all the mobile nodes attached with some elected CHs directly making the entire network of many groups 
of nodes headed by each CH. CHs are elected temporarily according to high residual energy, bandwidth and 
low mobility of node compare to other node of a cluster. A portion of an instance of our clustering scheme has 
been shown in figure-1.  
 
    3.1 Cluster formation strategy  
     The most important strategy in clusters scheme is the election of Cluster Head (CH). The stability of the 
routing directly depends on stability of CHs. In this scheme, we assume CHs are fully supportive and trusted 
nodes, therefore the importance of choosing a good candidate for CH is very high. This is a single hop 
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clustering scheme and other important strategy consisting adding a node to a cluster, deleting a node from the 
cluster and merging two clusters to form a new cluster same as FESC [12].   
 
3.2 Electing Custer Head (CH) 
      Four important factors of node are measured and combine with the help of fuzzy logic and get final metric. 
This final metric is used to elect CH and gateway node. The four important factors or metrics are: residual 
energy, trust value , mobility of  a node and connectivity to downlink neighbors. 
3.2.1 Residual energy of node: According to functionality of node at least 40% residual energy required to 
remain operational.  Let Ei is the total residual energy of node ni, ei is the expanded energy till current time and 
rem_eng(i) is the current residual energy as a fuzzy variable with values between 0 and 1. Therefore, the 
current residual energy represented by the equation (1). 
                      res_eng(i) =  1 −
𝑒𝑖
𝐸𝑖 
                                                                                                    (1)      
     The value of ‘res_eng’ below 0.4 means worst and near 1 means best. 
3.2.2 Trust Value of Node: At the initial stage that is when a node enters the network, 0.5 assign as a 
default trust value, where ‘trust_value’ is a fuzzy variable, values 0 to 1 indicating the trusted level of a node. 
There are two more supporting variables, one is ‘earn_trust’ which can take any natural number starting from 
2 and another is ‘loose_trust’ which is also a natural number ranges from 1 up to ‘earn_trust’. Initial values 
assigned to ‘earn_trust’ and ‘loose_trust’ are 2 and 1 respectively. When a node successfully transfers a packet 
its ‘earn_trust’ value increases by 1 if any kind of selfish behavior shown its ‘loose_trust’ value decreases by 1 
and if any, malicious behavior shown, then it lose all ‘trust_value’, so that its overall trust values decreases to 
0. Trust value will also decrease after successful completion of the data transfer request by one unit. A node 
can ask to CH to transfer its data packet only if it has positive trust value.  The entire activity is carried out by 
CH. The equation (2) is used to calculate current ‘trust_value’ of a node.  
       𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡_𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 1 −
𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑒_𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡
𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛_𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡 
                                                                                               (2) 
                                                                          
     More trust means more chances to become CH as well as more credit to send data packet. 
3.2.3 Mobility of node: In order to get the stable clustering scheme in MANETs, the CH of each cluster 
should less mobile with its downlink neighbors compare to other nodes of the same cluster. Let transmission 
power of a signal of node na is trans_power(a) and power of this signal when it being received at node ni is 
recv_powerb(a) and current distance between node na and nb at the time of i-th Hello message is disti(a,b). 
Therefore, as per Frii’s transmission equation: 
     recv_powerb(a) = K. trans_power(a)/ distiq(a,b)                                                                         (3) 
where K is constant and q is a factors with values 2,3 or 4 depending upon environment. Re-write the equation 
(3) and get 
disti(a,b) = q√ K. trans_power(a) / recv_power(a)                                                                           (4) 
Suppose t be the time interval between two consecutive HELLO message and n is the number of HELLO 
message observed. Therefore, the effective mobility of node na compared to its down link neighbors is 
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calculated by equation (5). The average mobility called ‘avg_mobility’ of a node na with respect to all its 
downlink neighbors is in the equation (6). 
 
                                 n 
      mobilityb(a) = { ∑ (disti(a,b) – disti-1 (a,b))} / (n x t)                                                                 (5) 
                                 i=2 
                                           nd 
      avg_mobility(a) = ∑ mobility(a) / k                                                                                                 (6) 
                                         K=1  
3.2.4 Downlink neighbors connectivity: The CH should have more downlink neighbors compare to other 
member node. Here we assume that the current CH has the standard number of downlink neighbors. This 
number of downlink neighbors of CH calculated by the fuzzy membership value of that CH, and initial 
standard membership value of this parameter are 0.5. Therefore, any node which has more number of downlink 
neighbors has more chances to become CH.  
    Let number of downlink neighbors of current CH is ‘ndnb_CH’, number of downlink neighbors of node ni 
are ‘ndnb_ni’.  At first, range of number of downlink neighbors need to be fixed according to the current 
standard and it is as in equation (7). 
                              ndnb_ni,            if ndnb_ni  ≤  2ndnb_CH      
   ednb_ni =  
                              2ndnb_CH,       otherwise 
 
Therefore,     dnc = ndnb_ni / 2ndnb_CH                                                                                (7) 
    Where ‘ednb_ni’ is the effective downlink neighbors and ‘dnc’ is the downlink neighbor connectivity, 
clearly range of ‘dnc’ is between 0 to 1. It is also assumed that ‘ndnb_CH’ is never be zero as before if become 
zero, the CH will be changed.    
  
4. Several security issues in MANETs and respective our proposed solution 
     Besides other challenges such as dynamic topology, energy constrained, lack of bandwidth, MANETs faces 
two more serious challenges, which are selfish and malicious behavior of the node. These challenges may 
come from some node(s) within the network. According to behavior of the node, all nodes of the network can 
be classified into three categories, such as normal node, selfish node and malicious node. The normal node 
works in the expected way, therefore no need to be worry about it. Selfish node works in unexpected ways, 
whereas malicious node does more harmful for the network. This scheme proposed a solution to security 
threats come from malicious node(s) within the network.  A malicious node gives main security challenges in 
MANETs. Different types of malicious attack and our proposed solution discussed below.   
     
4.1 Black Hole Attack 
       Malicious node could participate in communication of other nodes by replying false route reply (RREP) 
packet with mentioning shortest path to the intended destination. The source node could fall on this trap of 
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malicious node and start sending data packet through this malicious node. Therefore, malicious node will get 
chances to drop those packets or do some more harmful work such as tampering data packets etc.  
       In the figure-2 a portion of MANETs has shown, where malicious node is m, source node s and destination 
node is d. The source node s wants to communicate with destination node d. Therefore, node s broadcast route 
request (RREQ) packet to its neighbors including p, and p also broadcast this RREQ to its neighbor nodes 
same way. In this way malicious node m gets RREQ packet for destination node d, then node m could reply 
with a route reply (RREP) packet with false information by telling it has the shortest path to the destination d. 
The source node s believes that malicious node m, and start sending data packet towards m. Then m can drop 
those packets or do more harmful work on these data packets. Similarly reverse direction packet also can be 
captured by this malicious node.  
 
 
     
 
    
 
             Figure-2: Black hole attack by node m                        Figure-3: Solution to the black hole attack 
 
       This black hole attack can prevent through CH, or even arise, CH can give punishment to those malicious 
nodes and separate out from the network. As it discussed earlier in this clustering scheme, communication is 
performed through CH, Gateway node, source node and destination node. In this scheme as we mentioned, the 
black hole attack could arise by gateway node only, and between two neighbors CHs at most two gateway 
nodes could participate in a communication path. Gateway node is one-hop away from CH, Therefore, activity 
can be monitored by CH easily. If any of gateway nodes carry out a black hole attack, that is, its first reply a 
false information to enter in communication path, but if this node, starts dropping packet, then it can be easily 
caught on the red hand by consulting the neighbor CH. Then a malicious node can be separate out, not only 
from the cluster but from the network.  
     In the example mentioned in the figure-2, malicious node m can be bounded by two successive CHs, that 
are CH1 and CH2 which is shown in figure-3. Between these two CHs gateway nodes c and m can only assist 
communication between these two clusters headed by CH1 and CH2. Here node m is directly monitored by the 
cluster head CH1, therefore, node m has no chance to carry out the black hole attack as all communications 
controlled by only CHs in our scheme. Therefore, here this particular required communication can be done by 
CH1 and CH3.  
 
4.2 Wormhole attack: 
        Here two successive malicious nodes collude and make a wormhole between them. Whenever a route 
request comes, colluding nodes hide their node information, so source node does not understand the presence 
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of these two nodes. The source node estimates the path length, which are less than two hops to actual path 
length. Therefore, the probability of selection of this path is very high. If this path is selected, then source node 
start sending data packet through this path, then these two malicious nodes can drop these packets or do more 
harmful work such as tampering etc. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       Figure-4: Wormhole attack by nodes f and g            Figure-5: Solution to the wormhole attack 
 
      In this figure-4 a portion of the networks shown, here source node s wants to communicate with destination 
node d. Source nodes broadcast RREQ packet to its neighbors, including e. Whenever we broadcast RREQ, 
node f receive it and it passes through the wormhole to nodes g, and nodes g sends it to node h without putting 
any marks. Therefore, he understands that this route request packet comes from node e directly, but it was not; 
in this way a virtual shortest path s-e-h-d established but actual path is s-e-f-g-h-d. Now source node s selects 
this virtual path s-e-h-d instead real shortest path s-a-b-c-d. Whenever a source node s starts sending data 
packets through this shortest path, malicious node able capture those data packets. Reverse direction data 
packet also can be captured by the same way.   
     As it is earlier mentioned that at most two gateway nodes could belongs in between two successive CHs. In 
wormhole attack two successive nodes collude to make a wormhole between them, therefore wormhole attack 
is not feasible in single hop clustering scheme. Because two gateway nodes directly monitoring by its CH, and 
that is the advantage of single hop clustering scheme. Even such kind of activity initiated by gateway nodes, it 
would easier to catch in red hand by two successive CHs. In the example mentioned in figure-4, malicious 
nodes f and g collude to make a wormhole between these two nodes. But if we see this portion of the networks 
through our scheme then look like in figure-5. Here node f directly controlled by the cluster head CH1 and g 
directly controlled by CH2. The nodes f and g cannot collude to make a wormhole without knowing their 
respective cluster heads. Therefore, wormhole attacks not feasible in our single hop clustering scheme. 
 
4.3 Spoofing (Impersonation Attacks) 
      Some malicious nodes hide their addresses and use address of another node during communication. After 
that malicious node do harm the network. Therefore, some normal node gets falsely blamed and loose trust 
level for such type of malicious node in the network. This type of attack is called spoofing.  
     In this scheme, every node just single hop away from its respective CH, and reply to HELLO messages time 
to time to respective CH. If any node tries to carry out spoofing attacks by hiding its address, then it CH will 
check the address or identity through the link the node use to connect its CH, and if CH found that the node is 
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hiding it address, then CH will catch the malicious node on red handed from its cluster.   
 
4.4 Slander Attack:  
     It is quite similar to spoofing, here malicious node attempt to reduce the overall trust of another node. But 
here malicious node doesn’t hide its address, instead it collided with other malicious nodes. After that, start 
sending false information about a normal node to reduce their trust level within the networks.  
     A cluster member node might collude with other cluster member node and give false information to CH to 
reduce the trust value of the target node. But this is not possible for this scheme as explain in section-3; every 
node directly attached to respective CH; therefore, increase or decrease of trust value of a node directly done 
by respective CH without any certification of the other member node. So slander, attack can be resisted 
through CH.  
  
4.5 Routing Table Overflow Attack 
     This type of attack occurs basically on proactive routing where routing table is maintained by each node 
even routes are not required. A malicious node sends false information by claiming it has many routes to many 
nodes, but actually those nodes are not exists. In this way malicious node try to overflow the routing tables of 
other nodes, so that later other node could not add more real route information into the routing table.  
     Some member node may unnecessarily send false information to its CH to overflow routing table of that 
CH, therefore, required routing information could drop by CH. But here CH only node in a cluster which 
maintain route and store routing table and as already mentioned that this scheme assume CH node are trust 
worthy. Therefore, no question arises of this kind attack in our routing scheme.   
 
4.6 Grey Hole Attack 
     Here malicious node flow same principle of black hole attack, but here malicious node drops selective 
packet such as data packets, but let it go control packets such as RREQ packet. Therefore, another node falsely 
understands that malicious node positivity active in communication as normal node. 
     The Grey hole attack is very difficult to catch because here malicious node pass controlling packet as it 
mentioned. This scheme makes resistance to the grey hole as a black hole attack. Here also this can come only 
from gateway node. This scheme assures data packet delivery only after getting the acknowledgment message 
of respective data packet from neighbors CH. Therefore, this scheme can make resistances to grey hole attack. 
 
5. Simulation   
Simulation environment appears in table-1 for simulation experiments. Performance analysis of these 
algorithms is done using network simulation (NS-2) version 2.33. C3H is compared with CCS and EAACK 
which are two state-of-the art approached to detection of selfish and malicious nodes. Simulation metrics are a 
percentage of correct detection, malicious nodes, network throughput (percentage of data packets that could 
reach their respective destinations) and end-to-end delay per session.   
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       In C3H, each CH computes the trust value of its members based on their previous activities and this trust 
value is considered along with residual energy and relative velocity. Therefore, if a node ceases to forward one 
particular message, the CH can easily investigate the chances of its complete exhaustion and breakage of links. 
Table 1: Simulation Parameters 
Topology area 500m  500m 
Traffic type Constant bit rate (CBR) 
Packet size 512 bytes 
HELLO packet interval for original 
versions of protocols 
10 ms 
Node mobility 10-30 m/s 
Signal frequency 2.4 GHz 
Channel capacity 2 Mbps 
Transmission power 300-600 mW 
Receiving power  50-300 mW 
Mobility model Random waypoint 
Radio range 50 – 100 m 
Initial energy of nodes 5 j – 10 j 
Pause time 1 s 
Number of nodes 20, 40, 60, 80, 100 
 
Simulation graphs appear in figures 6, 7 and 8. Unlike CCS and EAACK, C3H considers residual energy of 
nodes and relative velocity between a CH and its members. If residual energy is very high and relativity is low, 
but still the node keeps mum to message forwarding request of its CH, then the node is accused of malicious 
 
Figure 6: Percentage of correct detection of malicious activities in different simulation runs 
 
activity and its trust value reduce. If this trust value reduces below a pre-defined limit, then the node is 
blacklisted network-wide. As seen in figure 6, correct detection of malicious activity is higher in case of C3H. 
Reason is that, its mentioned competitors do not consider factors like energy and velocity and therefore, 
sometimes punish non-malicious nodes which is not right. In that way, we lose links to certain good nodes and 
also packets generated by them are not forwarded to their respective destinations; no nodes cooperate with  
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Figure 7: Network throughput vs number of nodes 
  
 
Figure 8: End-to-end delay per session vs number of nodes  
them. So, network throughput in C3H is much higher than CCS and EAACk as seen from figure 7. Figure 8 is 
concerned with end-to-end delay which is much less in C3H due to availability of a number of good links. 
  
6. Conclusion and future scope 
       In this scheme cluster head (CHs) are the most vital node as this scheme assumes CH is a most trustworthy 
node. Therefore, choosing the best candidate for cluster head is most important, and this scheme does the same 
using four parameters described in subsection 3.2. Then through these CHs malicious attacks can be avoided 
and prevented.  CH takes packet transfer requests and give processing priority based on trust values of that 
node. This clustering strategy could also be used to increase node co-operation, which is a very essential to 
successful data transmission in civilian data communication using MANETs. 
 
References 
[1] C.K.  Toh , Ad Hoc Mobile Wireless Networks: Protocols and Systems, Prentice Hall PTR, 1st Edition 
(2002). 
[2] D. Helen, and D. Arivazhagan. Applications, Advantages and Challenges of Ad Hoc Networks, Journal of 
Academia and Industrial     Research (JAIR), 2(8), 453-457,(2014). 
[3] M Abolhasan, T Wysocki, E Dutkiewicz, A review of routing protocols for mobile ad hoc networks, 
Volume 2, Issue 1, Pages 1-22, (2004). 
[4] Perkins C.E and Bhagwat P, Highly dynamic Destination-Sequenced Distance-Vector Routing  (DSDV) for 
Mobile Computers,  SIGCOMM  ACM,  pp. 234-245(1994). 
  
 
11 
[5] S. Murthy and J.J.Garcia Luna Aceves, An efficient routing protocol for wireless networks,  Volume 1, 
Issue 2, pp 183–197,(1996). 
[6] Guangyu Pei, M. Gerla, Tsu-Wei Chen, Fisheye state routing: a routing scheme for ad hoc wireless 
networks, IEEE International Conference on Communications. Global Convergence Through Communications.  
IEEE Xplore, (2000), DOI: 10.1109/ICC.2000.853066. 
[7] Perkins C.E. and Royer E.M, Ad-hoc n-demand Distance Vector Routing, draft-ietf-manet-aodv-02.txt, 
(1998). 
[8] M. K. Marina, S. R. Das, On-demand multi path distance vector routing in ad hoc networks, in Proceedings 
of the Ninth International Conference on Network Protocols, IEEE Computer Society, Washington, DC, USA, 
pp. 14–23, (2001). 
[9] D. B. Johnson, Y. Hu, D. A. Maltz, The Dynamic Source Routing Protocol (DSR) for Mobile Ad Hoc 
Networks for IPv4, IETF  Request for Comments: 4728, (2007). 
[10] Anuradha Banerjee, Abu Sufian and Paramartha Duta, EMR-PL: Energy-efficient multipath routing based 
on link life prediction in ad hoc networks, Journal of Information and Optimization Sciences, 39(1), pp-285-
301, (2018). DOI: 10.1080/02522667.2017.1374733. 
[11] Park V. and S. Corson, Temporary-ordered Routing Algorithm (TORA). Internet Draft, draft-ietf-
manettora-spec-04.txt, (2001). 
[12] Anuradha Banerjee, Abu Sufian and Paramartha Dutta, Fuzzy-controlled Energy-efficient Single Hop 
Clustering Scheme with (FESC) in Ad Hoc Networks, Accepted in International Journal of Information 
Technology, Springer, (2018).  
[13] Hongmei Deng, Wei Li, and Dharma P. Agrawal, Routing Security in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks, IEEE 
Communications Magazine (October 2002). 
[14] Sergio Marti, T.J. Giuli, Kevin Lai and Mary Baker,  Mitigating Routing Misbehavior in Mobile Ad Hoc 
Networks, MOBICOM 2000, Boston, MA, USA, ACM 2000 1-58113-197-6. 
[15] Buttyan, Levente & Hubaux, Jean-Pierre. (2001). Nuglets: a Virtual Currency to Stimulate Cooperation in 
Self-Organized Mobile Ad Hoc Networks, (2001). 
[16] Petro Michiardi and Refik Molva, CORE: A COLLABORATIVE REPUTATION MECHANISM TO 
ENFORCE NODE COOPERATION IN MOBILE AD HOC NETWORKS,  Advanced Communications and 
Multimedia Security, IFIP International Federation for Information Processing (2002), DOI:10.1007/978-0-
387-35612-9_23. 
[17] Sheng Zhong, Jiang Chen and Yang Richard Yang, Sprite: A Simple, Cheat-Proof, Credit-Based System 
for Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks, IEEE INFOCOM 2003, DOI: 0-7803-7753-2/03. 
[18] Frank Kargl, Andreas Klenk, Stefan Schlott, and Michael Weber, Advanced Detection of Selfish or 
Malicious Nodes in Ad hoc Networks, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, (2014),                         DOI: 
10.1007/978-3-540-30496-8_13. 
  
 
12 
[19] N. Nasser and Y. Chen, Enhanced Intrusion Detection System for Discovering Malicious Nodes in Mobile 
Ad Hoc Networks, IEEE International Conference on Communications 24-28 June 2007. IEEE Xplore, DOI: 
10.1109/ICC.2007.196. 
[20] Nan Kang, Elhadi M. Shakshuki and Tarek R. Sheltami, Proceeding iiWAS '10 Proceedings of the 12th 
International Conference on Information Integration and Web-based Applications & Services, Pages 216-222, 
(2010), DOI: 10.1145/1967486.1967522. 
[21] Enrique Hernández-Orallo, M D Serrat, Olmos, Juan-Carlos Cano, Tavares De Araujo Cesariny Calafate, 
CM.; Manzoni, P,  CoCoWa: A Collaborative Contact-based Watchdog for Detecting Selfish Nodes. IEEE 
Transactions on Mobile Computing. 14(6):1162-1176. (2015), doi:10.1109/TMC.2014.2343627. 
[22] Jian-Ming Chang,  Po-Chun Tsou, Isaac Woungang, Han-Chieh Chao and Chin-Feng Lai, Defending 
Against Collaborative Attacks by Malicious Nodes in MANETs: A Cooperative Bait Detection Approach, 
IEEE Systems Journal, Volume: 9, Issue: 1, (2015 ). 
[23] Sara Berri, Vineeth Varma, Samson Lasaulce, Mohammed Said Radjef and Jamal Daafouz, Studying 
Node Cooperation in Reputation Based Packet Forwarding Within Mobile Ad Hoc Networks, International 
Symposium on Ubiquitous Networking  UNet 2017, Morocco, LNCS, volume 10542 
